TEMPORALITY AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION

 

TEMPORALITY AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION

Critical Reflections on the Rationality of Agents in Social Sciences

Guilherme da Fonseca-Statter

March 2019

 

1 INTRODUCTION The problem of the nature of time has occupied philosophers and scientists for many centuries. Let us begin by clarifying that this brief article does not intend to discuss in detail the very complex problem of the intrinsic nature of time, a problem in which views from physics and philosophy intersect, or converge. This is a very old question, originating at least from Greek philosophers and revived in medieval scholasticism. In this regard, the positions of Saint Augustine and, later, Saint Thomas Aquinas are reminiscent. In short, while Saint Augustine viewed time from the perspective of human experience, that is, psychological time, Saint Thomas Aquinas adopted the Aristotelian perspective of time as a flow susceptible to measurement, that is, what clocks measure. In this regard, it should be said that, in defining what time is, there has always been an attempt, implicit or explicit, to avoid circular reasoning. And, regarding this definition, the enigma or paradox of Saint Augustine is known, who tells us, asking himself:

 "What, then, is time? Who can explain it clearly and briefly? Who can grasp it, even in thought, and then translate its concept into words? And what subject is more familiar and more frequently discussed in our conversations than time? When we speak of it, we understand what we say. We also understand what is said to us when we speak of it. What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; but if I want to explain it to someone who asks me, I no longer know."

In this regard, one also recalls the debate that took place almost a hundred years ago, involving Albert Einstein, then still a young physicist, and Henri Bergson, then at the height of his fame as a philosopher of solid repute. Thus, in 1922, a brief but crucial debate took place at the French Philosophical Society between the two figures regarding the nature of Time. Albert Einstein had just published his Theory of Relativity and, in that session, emphatically declared that, strictly speaking, "there would be no 'Time' for philosophers." For the physicist, there would be only the Time of Physics and the Time of Psychology. In response to Einstein's statement, Henri Bergson published the book "Durée et Simultaneité, à Propos de la Théorie d'Einstein" a few months later. However, according to generally accepted knowledge about the Theory of Relativity, the speed of light is absolute, constant in a vacuum, and cannot be exceeded. In this context, it could be argued that the speed of light is something more fundamental than Time and Space. If so, Einstein's genius must have been to realize that both Space and Time must be flexible (relative) in order to adjust to the invariable speed of light. On the other hand, as far as we know, while the notion of Space has already been adequately "quantized," the same is not true of the notion of Time. In other words, while physicists have already succeeded, at least for technological purposes, in quantizing Space by defining minimum quantities of matter and/or energy (the quantum), what seems to be a consensus among theoretical physicists is that Time flows continuously, without "gaps" in time. Which, in a way, may even make sense, given that the entire Universe is inextricably in constant evolution.
In any case, the most consensual understanding of the notion of time is that it is important to distinguish between different perspectives, particularly that of linear or chronological time (measured with clocks of various types) and that of psychological time, the time we each perceive intimately and according to the multiple circumstances of life. However, Hermann Minkowski, a contemporary of Albert Einstein, introduced an interesting distinction between "specific time" (or "proper time," in the technical jargon of the English language), that which is measured between two events by the same clock ("the time that passes at a given point in space"), and "coordinate time" (or "coordinate time," also in the technical jargon of the English language), that time measured by an observer distant from both events.
On the other hand, according to what some scientists tell us, for contemporary physics, time is not exactly a flow, something that passes, or a sequence of events in any region of space. Just as we are accustomed to thinking of space, in its comprehensive totality, not only as "being here" (where we are), but also in other regions (where we are not, but could be), we should think of time as existing perennially, in all its extension and independently of our perception. Therefore, from this point of view, what happens is that each of us "visits" or experiences certain regions of Time, from birth until death, and not others. The past, present, and future simply exist; we are the ones who cannot visit (experience) all of their instances. What then is Time? Is it truly in permanent flux, or is it merely an illusion that interferes with the self-perception of sentient beings? These and some other questions continue to be asked of many human beings. In this type of reflection, common to all civilizations and cultures, two major philosophical positions have already been identified, more or less explicit or formalized: that of the "presentists" (the past and the future simply do not exist) and that of the "eternalists" (the past and the future do exist somewhere in some other dimension of the Cosmos, other than the one in which we find ourselves).
And then there's a whole series of (almost) common-sense observations, or observations that have been passed down to us through the wisdom of the people. Phrases like "time is merely existence passing from moment to moment," or "time is merely that which passes from event to event," or "the sequence of actions," or even "time is the permanent becoming." In this regard, another aspect is worth mentioning: the sociocultural construction of the idea of Time. Some anthropological records have already mentioned the interesting view of Time held by the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic group in Kenya. According to this tradition, the Past is before us, and we can see it in (almost) its entire dimension. It is the Future that lies behind us, and therefore we cannot see it. The question of the nature of Time continues to occupy the attention of philosophers and physicists today, but the purpose here is much more prosaic. The idea here will be to address, albeit succinctly, some specific questions about the measurement (or scale) of time, which, due to its enormous variety of rhythms, end up being the origin of many misunderstandings in the sciences in general and in the sciences of complexity in particular. In this context of complexity, we are thinking even more specifically about the sciences of societies (animal and plant).
In any case, we will adopt here the position of considering Time as a continuous flow of events, a flow that is continually manifesting itself in the form of change. Change will then be the fundamental criterion for an operational definition of Time. Above all, change in permanent becoming in the form of composite things, in their internal structure, and in their connections with their respective environments. As a result of these connections, we will also have change, always change, in these same environments. Apparently, or as far as we can tell today, what does not change (in form or in its internal structure) is only each elementary component, the "atoms," whose intimate nature remains under investigation. In this sense, the notion of change (and, consequently, the notion of time) is only relevant to the things and phenomena or processes that result from the varied forms of aggregation of these "atoms." In other words, we consider here that at the level of the most elementary "entities" of the "matter-energy" continuum, there will be no change (these elementary "entities" remain the same, albeit in permanent "vibration"), so that, at this level, it makes no sense to speak of, or discuss, what Time is. In short, we will then have chronological time (or that of physical beings), psychological time (or that of the common experience of each human being), and finally, and for the facts that most interest us in the context of this article, historical-social time. In this particular context, another dimension or variant that is important to discuss in more detail here is that of the various scales, both of chronological time and of historical-social time, which seem to us to be the most relevant for the study of any phenomena pertinent to each scientific discipline. In other words, the temporality relevant to each of the various branches of knowledge or relevant to the phenomena under study. This is regardless of the relative nature of the measurement of time, which will always underlie the observation and study of any and all phenomena.
To conclude this general introduction, we suggest reading Etienne Klein's (2007) very interesting book, "Time, from Galileo to Einstein," which won the "La science se livre" award in 2004, as well as the essays by Julian Barbour, Sean M. Carroll, Klaus Kiefer, and Carlo Rovelli, referenced in the bibliography.
 
2. TEMPORALITY AND RATIONALITY
Let us now turn to the facet of the cosmos that interests us most here: the social universe in our human dimension. We began earlier by mentioning the "time of physicists" (of which Einstein spoke) as well as the "time of psychologists." It is also important to discuss in some detail historical-social time, in its multiple facets, whether in terms of philosophical or scientific reflection, or in terms of its application in various technologies. Therefore, we will begin by bringing up, as an illustrative example, the case of the so-called social sciences. More specifically, and because it is the branch of social science that has had the greatest, but sometimes most hidden, impact on the lives of human societies, we will first discuss the relevance of Time in Economics and Anthropology, two disciplines that typically present themselves as polar opposites in their respective approaches to their "objects of study." According to a seemingly consensual perspective among economists of the so-called "mainline," economics presents itself as the study of how individuals in society ultimately decide, with or without the use of money, about the use of scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various products and services and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among the various individuals and groups in society. This perspective is conveyed to us by some renowned authors, such as Samuelson and Nordhaus (cited in Plattner, 1989).
For its part, anthropological science conventionally presents itself as the "science of primitive societies" (Copans, 1988). According to this same author, Anthropology would then be primarily the study of societies differentiated over time, in relation to the archetype of capitalist society ("modern" and/or "Western"), that is: (1) pre-capitalist (which takes into account their level of historical development), (2) non-Western (which takes into account diverse cultural values and models), and (3) non-European (which takes into account the geographic area or perspective). Strictly speaking, and as Jean Copans further points out, anthropological science today works particularly on developing an analytical and explanatory theory of uneven social, economic, and historical development. Thus, and as a result of this (almost radical) change in perspective, the themes addressed by Economic Anthropology (a scientific specialty that developed from the 1950s onwards) began to have as their object of study not only the aforementioned pre-capitalist societies (in any case, either extinct or in the process of extinction), non-Western and non-European, but also the "capitalist", "European", and "Western" societies, peoples, states, or nations. In other words, the most industrialized societies at the "center" of the world-system that Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of. Therefore, the topics discussed in a comprehensive program for this course should include themes such as: - The hunting and gathering economy and social behavior in bands - The economics of horticulture and social behavior in 'clans' and 'tribes' - Extensive, intensive, rainfed, and irrigated agriculture - Exchange, commerce, and markets in pre-capitalist stages, or fairs, markets, and exchange venues - Peasants and their worldview - Economic behavior in markets - Trade and markets in developing urban areas - Industrialized agriculture - The informal economy; crafts on the fringes of industrialized societies; the parallel and/or "hidden" economy - Women and economic institutions; the social division of labor and social schemes of reward and remuneration. - Resource management in communal or community property.
All of these topics are areas of study that typically fall within the core interests of Economic Anthropology and, with regard to their specificity in industrial societies, sometimes also within the disciplinary specialty known as Sociology of Work. It should also be noted, by way of conclusion to this first point of this essay outline, that these topics are precisely those that legitimately lead anthropologists to be interested not only in so-called "traditional," "rural," or "primitive" societies, but also in the economic activities and behaviors derived from them in urban and/or "industrialized" societies. It should also be noted that these topics are typically less considered by conventional economists, even though they attract the attention of specialized economists, although they end up constituting the meeting point of the two disciplines in question here: Economics and Anthropology. Regarding each of the aforementioned study topics (indicated as illustrative components of an Economic Anthropology research program) and taking into account the specific perspective of cultural contexts and inherent economic rationalities, and as hopefully evident from reading the reflections that follow, we can already point out that each of these study topics has its own specific timeframe, its own pace of transformation, its own evolutionary cycle. It turns out that it is precisely in relation to this very evolutionary cycle, specific or characteristic of each type of phenomenon, that we can speak of a given behavioral rationality.
 
3. SOME METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
Staying within the field of the so-called "social sciences" (and because in this comparison, the time vector is particularly relevant), one of the first questions that arises is the division of fields of activity or the distinction of viewpoints between, for example, economics and anthropology. In Christina Gladwin's perspective (Plattner, 1989), it is no longer possible to decide, from the outset, whether a given social scientist or social and economic development professional, working in the field in Africa (for example), is an anthropologist, an economist, or even a sociologist. Reading any article on a hot topic in current development also does not initially reveal the author's academic discipline. And yet, in the field of overlapping concepts and analytical tools where economics and anthropology meet (and sometimes even clash), we find a confrontation, still unresolved (if it ever can be), between two fundamentally antagonistic currents: On the one hand, we have those who consider economics to be the study of a particular facet of all human activity. Thus, according to Lionel Robbins, political economy is "the science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and rare means that have alternative uses" (quoted by Godelier, in Copans et al., 1988). This means, we add here, that studies within the scope of Social Psychology, namely the Theories of Equity and Inequity (of Homans and Adams), would also end up falling within the realm of economics.
On the other hand, we have those for whom, according to Godelier and following the classical economists of the 19th century, as well as Karl Marx, "economic science analyzes the structures and forms of production, distribution, and consumption of material goods within different types of society." This concerns, as will be evident, the controversial issue (which we will limit ourselves to mentioning here) of "formalism" and "substantivism." It should be emphasized, in any case, that the starting, or fundamental, concepts for any and all analytical discussions, and which are common to both currents (at least as topics or themes of analysis), are the notion of scarcity and the notion of value, which are, in turn, related to the notion of utility. It is worth repeating: the notions of scarcity, value, and utility. In the case of the notion of scarcity, one must begin by noting the aspect of the concept's historical and sociological relativity. What is scarce today may not be so tomorrow, without the objectively measurable physical quantities having changed significantly. What we see is that scarcity ends up being a social relationship that derives from concrete situations in which the "supply and demand curves" are historically and socially determined.
Thus, while for the formalist current in Anthropology and the marginalist current in Economics, scarcity is something absolute and determinable according to the axiomatic premises of their theoretical constructs (where we would have the "principle of utility maximization" and the "infinity of needs," in contrast to a material limitation of means and resources), for the substantivist current in Anthropology, as well as for the Marxist and institutionalist currents in Economics, scarcity is always a concrete (and tendentially) conjunctural, historically, and socially determined situation. Godelier refers to the case of the scarcity or non-scarcity of the time factor (whether among the Kuikuros of the Amazon or the Sianes of New Guinea), which, as he rightly points out, will depend on the structure of values and preferences of the peoples and/or social groups involved in the decisions about what to do with the available time. Which, by the way, in terms of so-called chronological time and the average lifespan of each member of the human species, is objectively and rigorously (...) the same for all members of the human species, given that planet Earth continues and will continue to revolve around the Sun with an almost pendular regularity, since Creation (give or take a millisecond) and most likely until the "consummation of time." And yet, we know how the social perception of time varies with human groups and cultures, their geography, and their history.
We will therefore need to consider in some detail the problem of economic agents' perception of the Time in which they move, in relation to which they make decisions, and which is truly relevant to them. On the other hand, and to conclude this very brief section, we should also bear in mind or underlying our reflection that, as René Thom (1991) would say, Catastrophe Theory is, strictly speaking, the phenomenology of surfaces of discontinuity. Now, if we consider that its application to the social and economic sciences views each concrete historical moment as yet another "surface of discontinuity," then we should consider that each of these concrete historical moments has underlying, or corresponds to, an interweaving of an indeterminate number of "waves of variability" of uncertain or little-known dimension (or mathematical function). The "art" of futurology should therefore require identifying the determining "wave of variability" (or set of "waves of variability") that will be present and active at each specific historical moment. In other words, "the pace at which each of the social, biological, or physical processes in development unfolds."
 
3. TIME AND RATIONALITY
The economic orthodoxy underlying neoliberalism that has prevailed in the dominant spheres of the so-called "Bretton Woods Institutions," namely the IMF and the World Bank, as well as in the rest of the institutions of the constellation of organizations that propose to form a kind of governance of the global economy, is based, as is known, on a deductive and a priori principle: that individual behavior is ultimately based on the principle of utility maximization. It so happens that, in terms of the development of ideas, and according to Joan Robinson (1973), the great contribution of John Maynard Keynes's "General Theory" was the radical break with neoclassical orthodoxy (of an axiomatic nature), in which the rationality claimed for the behavior of the agents comprising the economic system, by its proponents and defenders, was considered "eternal" (therefore outside of concrete, historical, social, and human time) and "universal" (therefore outside of any and all geographic and cultural contexts). According to the same Joan Robinson, Keynes explicitly and specifically sought to study the concrete economy of his time, with the intention of understanding and explaining what was objectively happening in the concrete, historically and culturally conditioned societies he was given to know. In this sense, we could say that Keynes (re)paved the way for the future intersection of the fields of interest of Economic Theory and Anthropology. We say it (re)opened for the simple reason that Marx and Engels had already reflected and written about the multiple relationships between history and culture, on the one hand, and political economy, on the other. It should be added, in passing, that at the deepest levels of analysis in neoclassical economics, society, in its entirety, has been conceived as a harmonious whole without internal or inherent conflicts of interest. For this analytical school, in human society there would be no classes or other social groups that might have conflicting interests. It is worth mentioning here a famous quip by Margaret Thatcher, according to which, strictly speaking, there would not even be a society, only individuals.
We thus also see that the proponents and defenders of the substantivist line are also those who characterize the science of economics as the concrete study of the concrete conditions of production and distribution of goods and services considered useful and/or necessary by the members of any given society. As Joan Robinson might have suggested, formalists discuss "things" (emotionally and intentionally neutral entities), while substantivists discuss "people." For "things," Time is neutral, and for "people," Time is everything and decisive. This is relevant to refer to the famous question, much discussed among Marxists, about a future and eventual overcoming of Capitalism and the gradual and concomitant disappearance of the State, with a supposed transition to Socialism. In this regard, it is said that we would move from a "government of people" to a "government of things." It seems an ironic paradox that, at least on a superficial level of reflection, Marxists are proposing or suggesting a possible societal organizational paradigm, according to which economics, after having been viewed as a historical science (primarily by Marxists), comes to be considered a physical science. For that is what it is all about: a discipline of social engineering that has already been called "Physical Economics," or the detailed study of costs and benefits, even in energy terms, of any project involving the productive innovation of goods and services. Returning to the main line of argument that concerns us here, another question that would then arise would be whether it even makes sense to discuss "time and rationality" in a context in which one of the two lines of argument in question does not even consider time as one of its elements of analysis, except in a derivative and subordinate manner, particularly in the issue of interest rates and the role of money as a link between the present and the future. We believe that it is not only pertinent to discuss such an issue, but also that it is essential to introduce the dimension of "time" in some detail precisely in order to have a deeper understanding of the entire issue of the problem of "economic rationalities" in relation to the respective cultural contexts.
 
4. SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE TIME DIMENSION
Let us first consider that the time dimension is variably relevant to each specific field of scientific analysis. On the other hand, this relevance can also vary within each scientific discipline, depending on the type of phenomenon or process to be studied. Let us therefore consider some examples by way of illustration. To begin with what is usually considered the most fundamental of sciences, Physics, when considering this discipline, we must consider its different branches or distinct areas of study, such as Mechanics, Electromagnetism, and Thermodynamics. In the specific case of Mechanics, we could also consider Celestial Mechanics and the mechanics of planetary phenomena, notably Kinematics, Dynamics, and Statics. We can therefore note that within each of these branches of Physics, there will naturally be room for the consideration of time units of different dimensions. In Astronomy or Celestial Mechanics, the most relevant units of time can range from years to millenniums or even "millions of light-years," a unit of measurement where Time and Space converge. In forensic analysis of vehicle accidents due to "excessive speed," it is commonplace to resort to kinematics, with time units on the order of seconds being relevant. Also in Physics, if we consider Quantum Physics, we see that, at a certain level of analysis, even the dimension of Time is irrelevant. However, the phenomenon of radiation can be highlighted, which has even been used to date phenomena, such as "carbon-14."
We thus move on, again and always by way of example, to the case of Chemistry, and this applies to most of the most common or easiest-to-enumerate phenomena. In this case, the most commonly relevant set of time units is probably in the order of magnitude of seconds and minutes. In some cases, microseconds or hours. It suffices to think of the case of explosions (extremely rapid or "instantaneous" oxidation reactions), or even the case of the "rusting" of metal structures (which, strictly speaking, can take months to become more visible). In the case of Geology and Astronomy, disciplines in which Physics and Chemistry converge, the most relevant time units for the phenomena studied there can range from centuries to "millions of years." Consider the phenomenon of continental drift or the cycles of comets within a solar system. Let us also consider the erosion of mountains and the sedimentation of soils. If we then look at the case of Biology and specifically at some phenomena specific to Botany or agricultural techniques, the most relevant set of time units is likely to be that associated with the cycle of annual seasons. This, of course, applies to so-called temperate climates, since in the case of equatorial climates, the theme of time takes on an even different perspective. But, whether we are dealing with societies in temperate or tropical zones, what is relevant in terms of Ecology and Biology is the alternation of seasons throughout the year, and this alternation is measured in months rather than days, hours, or minutes. In some cases, the cycle will be longer, as is the case with fruit trees or the growth and reproduction of animals. Underlying this temporality of cycles that repeat themselves due to their insertion in any given area of the planet, we must also consider the "life cycle" (of plants and animals), from seed to germination, growth, aging, and death. Still in the field of Biology, however, a whole series of phenomena for which the relevant unit of time is the hour or the day are also well known and studied.
In behavioral psychology, the study of personalities and their various individual characteristics typically requires the consideration and study of time periods expressed in decades. In the case of sociology and anthropology, or the study of the configurations assumed in the formation of groups and social interactions and their respective networks, always in dynamic transformation, one must consider the increased complexity of generational efforts to adapt concretely to the diverse environmental or ecological circumstances in which these groups find themselves. Studies of the evolution of systems of symbols, codes, and hierarchies of values that characterize various societies naturally require the consideration of units of time that are most often expressed in decades, generations, or even centuries. Here too, underlying this temporality of cycles that repeat themselves due to their insertion in any given area of the planet, are various "life cycles" (of habits, fashions, symbols, and traditions), from their emergence, dissemination, fading, and extinction. It also happens that at any given moment, various evolutionary processes within all these "systems" converge, or do not converge, and sometimes some of these processes intersect or collide, giving rise to various types of disturbances. These are the aforementioned "waves of variability" of uncertain or little-known dimension (or mathematical function).
On the other hand, attention should be drawn here to two distinct types of study: the "photograph" of a given situation in which any given society finds itself, and the "film" of its evolution over a given period of time. These are what experts call "synchronous" and "diachronic" studies. In any case, in the case of human societies, there are moments when revolutions are "snapshots" in which history is compressed, as Lenin already pointed out, in a very clear (albeit implicit) reference to the relevance that would then have been the discussion of the various evolutionary cycles, in different societies and with diverse social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics. Here too, it is extremely important to take the time factor into account when considering the rationality of socioeconomic actors. The rudimentary table that we constructed in a very preliminary way (and strictly only for illustrative purposes) and that we present below, seeks to summarize and systematize what was outlined above, about the time vector and the rationality that underlies the choice of the relevant time units.
 

Science or Branch of Knowledge	Most Relevant Units of Time
MECHANICS	Seconds, Minutes...
ATOMIC PHYSICS	Nanoseconds, Picoseconds (or much shorter...)
CHEMISTRY	Minutes, Hours...
ASTRONOMY	Century, Millennia, Millions of Years... "Light Years"
BIOLOGY	Months, Years, Decades
GEOLOGY	Centuries, Millennia, Millions of Years
PSICHOLOGY	Years, Decades...
SOCIOLOGY	Decades…
ECOLOGY	Decades... Centuries...
PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL	Months, Years, Decades…
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	Nanoseconds...Seconds... Minutes...

 
Returning to the "thread of our story," it is also important to note that, for each of the various branches of knowledge or scientific disciplines, it will be necessary to consider not only the perspective of the most relevant or pertinent time units for each type of phenomenon or process under study, but also the degree of "distance" on the part of any researcher in relation to any efforts at empirical observation. That is, even within each branch or scientific discipline, depending on the process under study and the distance it requires, it is reasonable to assume that we may have to consider different temporalities as more or less relevant. At the risk of some repetition, we have thus seen that a single study of the same reality may require considering different "levels of analysis" and, consequently, different relevant time units. This will be the case, for example, in the study of trees and a forest of which these trees are a part, as well as the evolution of their surrounding climate. In the case of each tree (a branch of Botany within the science of Biology), the most relevant unit of time is likely to be the year or the decade. In the case of forestry (a branch of Ecology within the same science of Biology), it is natural that the most relevant unit of time is at least the decade and more likely the century. Finally, with regard to climate evolution, it seems that the most relevant unit of time may be the century, or even the millennium, given that the World Meteorological Organization defines a period of thirty years as the minimum reference unit for classifying a climate.
 
On the other hand, given the functional characteristics of social systems, already discussed by generations of sociologists since Marcel Mauss (and his "total social phenomena"), and taking into account the various levels of depth as "operational conceptual frameworks" (Gurvitch, 1979), we should bear in mind that one of the analytical parameters that allows us to more clearly distinguish the various levels of depth is Time, as well as the respective unit of measurement most relevant to the processes underway at each level of social reality. Regarding the specificities of social-historical time, and regardless of the particular question of the relevance of this or that unit of measurement, Gurvitch draws our attention to the existence of diverse perspectives on the flow of time in terms of the perception that different social groups have, according to the different levels of depth at which we place ourselves. In this context, each social group always ends up having diverse perceptions of the flow of time, according to the "substance" or consistency of each type of phenomenon occurring in each society. We would thus have: - Morphological-ecological time; a long-lasting time that passes "to the slowdown," in which the past prevails over the present and future, and in which continuity is emphasized at the expense of discontinuity, a classic example of which is the case of demography. - The time inherent in organized apparatuses and the different perceptions of time that arise from the positions occupied in structures and organizations, whether changing or stationary, a classic example being the conflict between different power structures or class struggles. It will also be the time of governance and the respective planning of collective activities. - The time of models of behavior, rules, signs, and conduct of a certain regularity; heroes, fads. - The time of social roles and collective attitudes. - The time of symbols, ideas, and collective values. - The times inherent in the various microsocial frameworks (masses, communities, communions).
Gurvitch (op.cit. 91 to 143) indicates 10 levels of in-depth analysis, clarifying, however, (and with emphasis), that this is not an ontological or substantive list, but rather an analytical instrument and as such it is reasonable or operational to identify and discuss a greater or lesser number of in-depth levels.
 
Levels of Depth in Sociological Analysis
Level of Visibility or Opacity of Analysis Parameters
1. Morphological and Ecological Surface. Population, cultivated land, buildings...
2. Organized Behaviour and Social Organizations
3. Social Models and Behavioural Referents
4. Regular but Not Formalized Behaviour
5. Social Role Scheme (Assigned and/or Acquired)
6. Expected Collective Attitudes
7. Collectively Recognized Social Symbols
8. Innovative, Effervescent, and Creative Behaviour
9. Collective Ideas and Values (Underlying and Not Visible...)
10. Collective Mental States and Psychic Acts
 
We should emphasize here that one of the characteristics or parameters that allows us to distinguish the different levels of analysis at which we find ourselves at any given moment is precisely the greater or lesser ease or difficulty with which the situation changes at each of the levels considered, as a function of time and the respective unit of measurement. We will mention later the distinction between a substantivist and a formalist approach in economics. In this context, we can now see that, as long as the most relevant time horizon is taken into account, the a priori principle of utility maximization, typical of the neoclassical formalists we discussed earlier, can be acceptable to economic agents, even from a substantivist perspective (that is, from a Marxist or Institutionalist perspective). To conclude this section of this article, we also draw attention to the problem of the time scale in relation to potential cycles of evolution. To illustrate the point we wish to make here, assuming the so-called "Big Bang theory" is correct and the Universe has been expanding for many billions of years, then this would perhaps be the only non-cyclical process in Nature. Moreover, the entire evolution of the Universe, from the formation and death of stars, to the emergence of certain life forms, their expansion, decay, and extinction, all processes in the Cosmos present themselves to us with a certain cyclical character. That is, with a specific rhythm for each type of phenomenon or process. The point is that the length of human life, even taking into account the invention of writing and the recording of multiple events, often leads us to think of certain types of phenomena or processes as cyclical when, strictly speaking, these same phenomena can be viewed as either cyclical or non-repetitive.
The case that interests us most here will be the evolution of the human species, since its emergence approximately 200,000 years ago as an evolutionary branch of the hominid family. In this case, we will consider a prolonged, continuous, albeit bumpy, evolution from this ancestry to the present day, when the number of members of the species already exceeds 7,000,000,000. For illustrative purposes (or using a contrarian argument and with no intention other than to encourage reflection in terms of conceptual contextualization), allow me to bring up a kind of "protohypothesis," implicit in a science fiction novel by the American writer Walter Michael Miller Jr. (1961). According to this "proto-hypothesis," although not explicitly stated in the aforementioned book, humanity could be experiencing a second (or third...) round of planetary evolution, with social, cultural, and economic development in a cyclical, upward spiral. Upon reaching a certain point of technological saturation (nuclear arsenal, resource depletion, rampant pollution), there would be a global collapse (a thermonuclear or bacteriological war, for example), with a return to a "caveman" situation, with "half a dozen" thousands of survivors, a return that would occur in little more than two or three generations. This global collapse would once again give Nature the necessary and sufficient time to recover. In this "proto-hypothesis," this global evolutionary cycle would eventually last some 10,000 to 20,000 years.
 
5. SCIENCE, HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, AND PERMANENT BECOME
In the last two decades of the 19th century, a controversy arose in the Germanic world regarding the correct method to apply to the study of economics. This controversy became known as the "Methodenstreit der Nationalökonomie." The opposing positions were those of the so-called German Historical School and the so-called Austrian School. In very brief terms, it can be argued that while proponents of the German Historical School (particularly Gustav Schmoller) argued that the correct method should take into account the evolution of societies over time (their history), adherents of the Austrian School (particularly Carl Menger) defended (and still defend with all intensity today) the timeless nature of economics. For the former, economics would be a historical science, in which the interests of the national "collectivity" should be taken into account, while for the latter, economics would be like a Newtonian mechanics of mercantile phenomena in which Time is present (in the background) but neither interferes nor adjusts to the phenomena under study. The theme of "methodological holism" versus "methodological individualism" was (and still is) also underlying this. Therefore, for the Austrian School (and its neoclassical derivatives and deformations), economics would only have to consider individual human intentionality and action. In the case of the German Historical School, it would be necessary to consider the rationality of the State's decision-making power, while in the case of the Austrian School, it would only consider the rationality of the individual decision-maker. What is important for us to note here is that neither of these authors (and their respective "followers") takes into account the evolutionary nature of societies over time, regardless of the individual entities associated with them. Thus, the German Historical School has the merit of considering the historical nature of social sciences, particularly economics, but it seems to err, or "open the door" to criticism, by attributing protagonism and, therefore, intentionality to the "Nation" (represented by the State). The Austrian School has the merit of focusing on the motivation and intentionality of individual agents, but it commits the gross error, presumably due to an ideological bias, of failing to investigate and pursue to its fullest extent the logical consequences that emerge over time, which inexorably result, at the aggregate level of society, from each of the individual motivations and actions of each and every agent involved. Here we have an exemplary case of what can result from ignoring the vector of Time, the permanent becoming, in all its pertinence. It will also be an exemplary case of linear thinking that "overlooks" the emerging complexity that results from the evolution of distinct variables and whose tension is in the opposite direction.
In this regard, we could also invoke the Law of Entropy (or second law of thermodynamics), which tells us, among other things and with complete clarity, that Time moves or flows in only one direction. This same Law (considered one of the so-called fundamental laws of Nature) places History (with a capital "H") at the center of even that which is usually considered the most timeless of sciences: Mechanics. As Georgescu-Roegen would tell us, the mere existence of a scientific discipline such as Statistical Thermodynamics (which would seek to reclaim Mechanics from a condemned atemporality) would be a curious sociological phenomenon, worthy of study by both the Sociology of Science and Anthropology. Now, if Time flows in only one direction, this simply means that History does not, in fact, repeat itself. Nor does it return. Monsieur De La Palice could not have said it better. On the other hand, on the scale of human lifespan, and even on the scale of the history of the evolution of human societies, many of the phenomena studied by many scientific disciplines appear to have a cyclical character. For technological or operational purposes, this can be considered true in the case of Physics. That is, for "like causes, like effects," or even that, in the case of Physics, "History, in fact, repeats itself." In the case of historical sciences, and particularly in the case of Economics, it is important to consider the evolution (and accumulation) underlying these cycles, as well as the intentionality and operational capacity of the various types of agents. The case to which attention is drawn here, and merely by way of example, is that of the so-called "Kondratiev waves or cycles" discussed by many historians. Underlying this question is the graphic representation of these cycles, which always convey the idea of a "stationary" (horizontal) wave rather than an oscillation on an ascending line. This ascending line corresponds to the process of wealth accumulation, population growth, and the progressive depletion of profitable investment opportunities. In other words, in the case of economic evolution, "History, in fact, does not repeat itself," Time does not go back.
In this context, issues such as "linear development" or "cyclical development" are widely discussed, or the transition from a situation of predominance of "gemeinshaft" to one of predominance of "geselshaft"; to use Ferdinand Tonnies's references. Émile Durkheim, on the other hand, spoke of progressive evolution and the transition from a situation of "mechanical solidarity" to one of "organic solidarity." This would be analogous to the biological paradigm of development in which, through functional specialization, we move from the "cell" (understood as a more or less uniform and universal interchangeable component) to "functionally specialized organs" and finally to the "organic being," complete, ontologically integral, and supposedly finalized. Regarding this historical transition from a type of "primitive community" to a type of "modern society," it can be said that it is also what underlies Karl Polanyi's theses in his book "The Great Transformation." We are talking here about processes whose study requires the consideration of units of time measured in centuries, even though the convergence of the evolution of some of the "specific variables" (their respective rhythms) can be verified (and studied) in much shorter periods of time (years or months). If we consider as reasonably consensual the idea that all science is a comprehensive set of "hypotheses," provisionally granted the status of "Theories" and as such subject to revision and/or reformulation, and that, on the other hand, as René Thom (the creator of the analytical methodology of "Catastrophe Theory") would say, "all science is based on the implicit assumption of structural stability" (quoted in Woodcock and Davis, 1991), then we would have to conclude that the evolution and transformation of any "structure" will always have its own specific rhythm and that any effort to scientifically study this fraction of reality will always require that the respective time frames be taken into account. If Priestley's or Lavoisier's experiments were processes that could be carried out and studied in terms of days or hours, the observation and study of social phenomena will require the consideration of rhythms and intervening variables, in which the truly relevant units of time may be the decade or even the century. In this regard, consider the case of the transition in South Africa from a "master democracy" in the style of the Athenian democracy of Classical Antiquity (the "Apartheid") to a multiracial democracy, with the recognition of formal equality of political rights for all members of the national community that is constituted in the form of the Republic of South Africa.
It can be argued that this transition was planned eight decades in advance, with all political decisions made and implemented by the Afrikaner national leadership over the decades having as their ultimate goal the integration of that community of "Dutch" origin into globalization, on an equal footing with the community of "English" origin. This is, therefore, a concrete case or illustrative example of the need to consider the issue of time and the various motivations involved ("intervening variables") in the study of the rationality of sociopolitical-economic action. To conclude this article, we will say that the main (or foundational) problem of the neoclassical approach to economics was its importation of the analytical mode of Newtonian mechanics instead of, for example, that of biology. If we revisit the previously outlined reflection on the relevance of choosing diverse (but specific) units of time for the scientific study of any phenomena, we can say that each type of phenomenon has, in its evolution and permanent becoming, its own rhythm (which brings us to the epistemological importance of the Lisbon School's proposal, with regard to its approach and study of the quantum "universe"). The permanent intertwining of all the multiple rhythms of the most diverse types of evolving phenomena necessitates a new type of approach to the study of phenomena. In a way, transposing to the sciences of societies, but with the necessary caution, the methodology proposed by Eurythmy, as discussed by José Croca and Rui Moreira.
 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARBOUR, Julian: The Nature of Time, https://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.3489.pdf
BOUDON, Raymond; La Place au Désordre, Presses Universitaires Françaises, Paris 1985
CARROL, Sean: What if Time Really Exists?, https://arxiv.org/pdf/0811.3772.pdf
COPANS, Jean: From Ethnology to Anthropology; in Copans et alia: Anthropology, Science of Primitive Societies? Editions 70, Lisbon 1988
CROCA, José and MOREIRA, Rui; Dialogues on Quantum Physics – From Paradoxes to Nonlinearity, Esfera do Caos, Lisbon 2007
CROCA, José; Dialogues on the New Physics, Complexity and Nonlinearity, Sphere of Chaos, Lisbon 2010
DURKHEIM, Émile; From the Division of Social Labor, Martins Fontes, São Paulo, 1999
FONSECA-STATTER, Guilherme: South Africa and the World-System: From the Boer War to
Globalization, Gerpress, Lisbon 2011.
GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, Nicholas: The Law of Entropy and the Economic Process, Argentaria,
Madrid 1996
GODELIER, Maurice: Definition and Field of Economic Anthropology, in Copans et al. (op. cit.) GURVITCH, Georges: The Current Vocation of Sociology, Edições Cosmos, Lisbon 1979
HAWKING, Stephen: A Brief History of Time, Gradiva, Lisbon 2000
KIEFER, Claus: Does Time Exist in Quantum Gravity? https://arxiv.org/pdf/0909.3767.pdf
KLEIN, Étienne; Time, from Galileo to Einstein, Kaleidoscope, Lisbon 2007
MILLER, Walter: A Canticle for Leibowitz, Éditions Denoel, Paris 1961
PENROSE, Roger: Cycles of Time, An Extraordinary New Vision of the Universe, The Bodley Head, London 2010
PLATTNER, Stuart et al.: Economic Anthropology, Stanford University Press, Stanford (California) 1989
POLANYI, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Edições 70, 2012
ROBINSON, Joan: Economic Heresies; Some Old-Fashioned Questions in Economic Theory MacMillan, London 1975
ROVELLI, Carlo: Forget Time, https://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.3832.pdf
THOM, René: Prédire n'est pas explicar, Flammarion, Paris 1991
TONNIES, Ferdinand: Communauté et société, PUF, Paris 2010

WOODCOCK, Alexander and DAVIS, Monte: Catastrophe Theory, Penguin Books Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1991